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I. INTRODUCTION
In a typical law school's introductory course on business organiza-
tions, we learn the legal relationships among three important actors of
a firm: the shareholders, the board of directors, and the executives.
The board as a whole constitutes the top-level manager of the firm,1
while the executives are the day-to-day managers of the firm. The law
assumes that shareholders are the owners of a firm, that shareholders
elect the board members, and that the board selects the firm's execu-
tives. Accordingly, a firm's executives are simply agents of the firm's
principals, i.e., the shareholders. The board of directors stands in be-
tween the agents and the principals to closely monitor the firm's exec-
utives in order to maximize shareholders' interest.
In contrast to the corporate structure idealized in the legal world, a
typical real-world publicly traded corporation often has a much differ-
ent structure. A firm's executives not only are the day-to-day manag-
ers of the firm, they also behave as if they own the firm. Most often,
the executives choose the candidates for the board members, and the
shareholders simply ratify the executives' choice. 2 The board does not
know most of the true "owners" of the firm, i.e., the shareholders.
Rather, the board remains passive most of the time, except perhaps
during crisis.3 The board also defers to the executives' decisions, ex-
cept perhaps when the firm is performing so poorly that the board has
to intervene. 4
Obviously, there is a gap between the law's assumptions and the
real-life situation for the board's role in corporate governance. The
board developed its current form in modern corporations as a market
response to the growing presence of these corporations in the econ-
omy.5 Corporate law came into existence as a legal response to corpo-
rate problems that the market does not properly cure by its own force.
The legal response, however, frames its solution based on its own as-
1. See Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. v. Cunninghame, (1906) 2 Ch. 34 (A.C.)
(holding that the directors are not agents but are managing partners of the corporation ap-
pointed by the shareholders); Cont'l Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 99 N.E. 138, 141 (N.Y. 1912) ("The
directors are not ordinary agents .... They are trustees ... with the power of controlling the
property ... without . . . hindrance.").
2. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors
and Their Monitoring of the CEO, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 96, 96 (1998).
3. See Sanjai Bhagat et al., Director Ownership, Corporate Performance, and Management
Turnover, 54 Bus. LAW. 885, 887-88 (1999).
4. See Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 454
(1988).
5. See Bhagat et al., supra note 3, at 886-87.
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sumptions for how the market should behave, even though these as-
sumptions may not be how the market performs in reality.
In the market, this corporate structure consisting of these three ac-
tors developed in the early twentieth century when corporate entities
grew so large in scale that they needed an enormous amount of capi-
tal, which required not just a few, but a large number of individuals to
contribute. 6 As both the size of the corporations and the number of
their shareholders grew, no individual shareholder or shareholding
group dominated or controlled the corporate entity. Consequently,
the professional management class developed to fill the role as daily
managers.7 The result is the separation of ownership and control. Be-
cause the owner now consists of too many diffuse individuals or
groups, collective action problems have made the owner a poor moni-
tor of the agent. The board of directors developed to fill in this moni-
toring gap. But, because the board is chosen by the professional
managers, not by the shareholders, the board's interest has always
been more aligned with the agent rather than with the principal. Ever
since this structure was developed in the early twentieth century, the
law has sought legal mechanisms to align the interest of the board
with that of the shareholders. 8
The legal mechanisms that seek to reform corporate governance fol-
low a spectrum of different assumptions and attitudes toward the role
of law in this arena. On one end of the spectrum is the view that a
capital market provides the necessary incentive for adequate corpo-
rate governance. Scholars under this view believe that "'disciplines of
the capital markets,' through the threats or actualities of takeovers,
would cause managers to take corrective action to improve perform-
ance."9 The other end of the spectrum resonates with the "race to the
bottom" view of Delaware's dominance in the corporate charter mar-
ket. Because scholars, under this view, believe that states' competi-
tions for corporate charters and the associated franchise fees benefit
managers and not shareholders, they argue for more federal regula-
tions in place of the current state law for corporate governance. 10 The
6. See id.
7. Id. at 887.
8. Id. at 888; see generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 223-26 (1933).
9. Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance,
48 Bus. LAWv. 59, 59 (1992) (citing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role
of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1169 (1981)
& Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics
in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981)).
10. See generally William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
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recently enacted Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX"),1 under which
Congress demanded a series of mandatory corporate governance mea-
sures, can be seen as a result of this view's advocates.
Neither end of the spectrum, however, provides a satisfactory an-
swer to corporate governance. On one hand, "[o]nly an extraordinary
optimist could believe.., takeover activity is an efficient way to deal
with the organizational deficiencies of American industries.112 After a
century of development of the current corporate form, shareholders
are still highly dissatisfied with the inadequate monitoring boards of
directors have provided. The recent wave of corporate scandals has
once again exposed board passivity in its monitoring role. On the
other hand, excessive federal regulation, such as SOX, is unlikely to
improve corporate governance but likely to cause significant ineffi-
ciency that will eventually be borne by shareholders. 13 Therefore,
state law, not the capital market alone or federal law, should continue
to shape corporate governance reform. This Article argues that to re-
capture the duty of regulating corporate governance from the federal
government, states, especially Delaware, should reevaluate their ide-
alized legal assumptions for the relationship between the sharehold-
ers, the board, and the executives. In order to be able to recognize the
true dynamics among these three actors, courts need to expand their
review of board operations. In particular, I propose that Delaware
courts adopt an expansive good faith evaluation for overall board op-
erations instead of focusing solely on the transaction that is the subject
of litigation. In a transaction-focused evaluation, courts may not have
sufficient facts to understand the true relationship between the direc-
tors and the executives. If courts can look beyond one board transac-
tion, the courts are much more likely to understand if the directors
adequately perform their monitoring role.
The next Part attempts to explain why the board of directors has a
tendency to stay passive.14 The Part evaluates, in particular, one long-
11. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
12. MICHAEL L. DERTOUZOS ET AL., MADE IN AMERICA: REGAINING THE PRODUCTIVE
EDGE 39 (1989); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A
Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1145, 1192-95 (1984) (arguing that the capital market is only an effective monitor in cases of
massive managerial failure).
13. See generally Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corpo-
rate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1529-43 (2005) [hereinafter Romano, Sarbanes-Oxley]
(reasoning a considerable body of corporate finance and accounting research does not support
the assertion that the substantive corporate governance mandates of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
will improve corporate governance or performance).
14. See infra Part II.
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standing corporate governance measure that seeks to improve board
passivity: the use of an independent board of directors. Numerous
studies have concluded, based on a variety of evidence, that indepen-
dent directors do not improve corporate performance. 15 That Part
then attempts to explain why these independent directors have been
largely inefficacious in their monitoring role. Three recent examples
of boards' monitoring failures, which all involved boards with a major-
ity of independent directors, are also in that Part. Part III offers my
proposal to the state law's approach to corporate governance. 16 So far,
Delaware evaluates a board's performance of its fiduciary duties only
for the particular transaction in dispute. The business judgment rule
largely protects directors' decision from judicial second-guessing. In
some recent cases, Delaware courts have emphasized directors' good
faith, the absence of which removes the business judgment protection.
I propose that Delaware courts expand the good faith evaluation to
the overall board operations instead of focusing solely on the transac-
tion in dispute. The final Part concludes.' 7
II. WHY DOES THE BOARD HAVE A TENDENCY TO STAY PASSIVE
AND WHY INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS Do NOT IMPROVE
BOARD PASSIVITY?
In order for a board of directors to vigilantly represent sharehold-
ers' interest and to closely monitor a firm's executives, one "intui-
tive" 18 solution is to fill the board with directors who are independent
of the firm's executives. For a long time, many scholars have advo-
cated for such independent directors, also referred to as outside direc-
tors.19 An independent director is usually defined as one who has no
financial interest in the firm other than the director's retainer fee.20
The assumption is that independent directors, in contrast to inside di-
15. See infra note 31.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard Black refer to this solution as following the "conventional
wisdom," since the solution appears to be the natural choice when no one is sure what an opti-
mal board's structure should be like. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relation-
ship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. LAw. 921, 954 (1999).
19. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.03 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1982); MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUC-
TURE OF THE CORPORATION 145-46 (1976).
20. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301(m)(3), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)) (noting that to qualify as independent, the director may not
"accept any consulting, advisory or other compensatory fee from the issuer" nor be an "affiliated
person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof").
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rectors, are less likely to defer to the firm's executives. 21 Although the
business community initially opposed to a mandate of the American
Law Institute requiring independent directors, a board consisting of a
majority of independent directors has become the present norm. 22 But
numerous studies find independent directors do not improve firm per-
formance and that these directors have a positive influence, at best, on
firms during a crisis.23
A. Academic Findings on Independent Directors' Performance
Scholars have characterized a board's functions into two categories:
monitoring of a firm's day-to-day performance and intervention dur-
ing crisis. 24 Professor Romano terms these two categories as the
strong form and the weak form of the monitoring board hypothesis. 25
Under the strong form, a board with a majority of independent direc-
tors would have a continuous effect on firm performance. 26 Thus, the
strong form of the hypothesis predicts a positive correlation between
the percentage of independent directors and firm performance. 27
Under the weak form, independent directors are better than insiders
to react to gross failures of a firm and to adjust the firm's strategies to
correct the failure. 28 Accordingly, the weak form of the hypothesis
predicts a positive correlation between the percentage of independent
directors and a firm's performance only during crisis.29
Numerous empirical studies based on a variety of analytical ap-
proaches have sought to measure independent directors' impact on a
firm's performance. 30 However, these studies have overwhelmingly
21. Roberta Romano, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, 5 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE
277, 281 (1996) [hereinafter Romano, Corporate Law].
22. Id. at 282-83.
23. See infra Part II.A.
24. Romano, Corporate Law, supra note 21, at 285.
25. See id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Romano, Corporate Law, supra note 21, at 285.
30. See, e.g., John W. Byrd & Kent A. Hickman, Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers?:
Evidence from Tender Offer Bids, 32 J. FIN. ECON. 195 (1992); Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael
S. Weisbach, The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance, 20
FIN. MOMT. 101 (1991); Paul W. MacAvoy et al., ALl Proposals for Increased Control of the
Corporation by the Board of Directors: An Economic Analysis, in STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS
ROUNDTABLE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PROPOSED PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Business Roundtable
1983); Hamid Mehran, Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership, and Firm Performance, 38
J. FIN. ECON. 163 (1995); Richard Schmidt, The Board of Directors and Financial Interests, 20
ACAD. MGMT. J. 677 (1977); Robert Stobaugh, Director Compensation: A Lever to Improve Cor-
porate Governance, 17 DIRECTOR'S MONTHLY 1 (1993); Shaker A. Zahra & Wilbur W. Stanton,
[Vol. 6:393
INSIDE THE BOARDROOM
concluded that the strong form of the monitoring board hypothesis
does not stand.31 Professors Romano, Bhagat, and Black, in two sepa-
rate literary reviews, examined dozens of studies, which have adopted
different performance measures and various types of data. 32 They
found that "[n]o matter what variable is used to measure perform-
ance, virtually all studies find that there is no significant relation be-
tween performance and board composition. ' '33 Significantly, one study
that adopted a definition of independent directors that yielded a
higher proportion of independent directors than other studies found a
significant negative relation between firm performance and board
composition. 34
Studies of specific events of a firm have found some support for the
weak form of the monitoring board hypothesis. 35 For example, Profes-
sor Weisbach's empirical study, based on data for all 495 NYSE-listed
companies between 1977 and 1980, found "firms with outsider-domi-
nated boards [we]re significantly more likely than firms with insider-
dominated boards to remove the CEO on the basis of performance. '36
Professor Weisbach provides a plausible story to explain this result:
"[F]ollowing poor performance, firms first respond by adding outsid-
ers to the board. If poor performance continues, these outsiders re-
move the CEO.''37  One separate study further found firm
performance modestly improved after its CEO was replaced.38 These
two studies, combined, support the hypothesis that a board dominated
by independent directors improves a firm's performance following the
firm's poor performance. Studies of other events are less clear-cut
The Implications of Board of Directors' Composition for Corporate Strategy and Performance, 5
INT'L J. MGMT. 229 (1988).
31. See Romano, Corporate Law, supra note 21, at 284-90; see generally Bhagat & Black,
supra note 18, at 922 (reviewing a number of empirical studies and concluding that these studies
show "no convincing evidence that firms with majority-independent boards perform better than
firms without such boards").
32. See Romano, Corporate Law, supra note 21; Bhagat & Black, supra note 18.
33. Romano, Corporate Law, supra note 21, at 287.
34. Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control
Agency Problems Between Managers and Shareholders, 31 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 377
(1996). The study examines the relationship between performance and seven types of control
mechanisms a firm generally adopts. Id. Except for board composition, the firms under research
have used optimal use of each of the six control mechanisms. Id. For board composition, the
study finds that more outside directors have a negative effect on performance, indicating that
firms have chosen too many outside directors. Id.
35. See Romano, Corporate Law, supra note 21, at 290; Bhagat & Black, supra note 18, at 923-
40.
36. Weisbach, supra note 4, at 432.
37. Id. at 454.
38. See David J. Denis & Diane K. Denis, Performance Changes Following Top Management
Dismissals, 50 J. FIN. 1029, 1055 (1995).
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than is the study of the scenarios of a poor-performing CEO. For ex-
ample, although some studies found evidence that target firms with
majority-independent boards extract higher prices from bidders than
insider-dominated boards, the studies do not tell us whether majority-
independent boards produce better outcomes for shareholders of po-
tential targets.39 Further, according to Professors Bhagat and Black,
the evidence does not strongly indicate whether independent boards
behave significantly more (or less) shareholder-friendly than other
boards in terms of adopting takeover defenses.40 On the other hand,
Professor Romano cites some studies that found a positive stock price
movement after a firm adopted a poison pill if outsiders dominated
the firm's board, but they found a negative price movement if insiders
dominated the firm's board.41 Taken as a whole, these empirical stud-
ies show that independent boards provide better monitoring for cer-
tain types of events, such as firing of the CEO following poor
performance, but less certain results for other events.
Besides measuring directly the correlation between a firm's per-
formance and its board composition, other studies sought to account
for the effect of board composition from other angles. 42 After all, the
business world is far more complex than the simple dichotomy of the
weak and strong forms of the hypothesis. 43 For example, a study com-
plied by Gillan and others found different types of firms choose dis-
tinctly different approaches to governance choices, implying that
different firms require different board structures.44 Furthermore,
April Klein found that different board committees required different
board composition; significantly, she found that insider presence on
finance and investment committees improved firm performance. 45
These two studies suggest that inside directors provide valuable con-
tribution to a firm's performance because different industries and
firms may have varying degrees of agency costs. Accordingly, they re-
quire different levels of monitoring from the board.46 Moreover, dif-
39. Bhagat & Black, supra note 18, at 928-29.
40. Id. at 929-30.
41. Romano, Corporate Law, supra note 21, at 292-93.
42. See, e.g., Stuart L. Gillan et al., Tradeoffs in Corporate Governance: Evidence from Board
Structures and Charter Provisions (June 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=917544 (unpublished working paper); April Klein, Firm Performance and
Board Committee Structure, 41 J.L. & ECON. 275 (1998).
43. Romano, Corporate Law, supra note 21, at 285.
44. See Gillan et al., supra note 42, at *1.
45. Klein, supra note 42, at 287-301.
46. Gillan et al. reason that the costs and benefits of monitoring agency problems differ across
firms and industries. Gillan et al., supra note 42, at *1. Accordingly, firms with high agency costs
require more powerful boards than firms with low agency costs. Id.
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ferent industries may require different sets of knowledge and
information from the directors. Thus, a firm may need more insider
directors, who tend to have a deeper understanding about the firm
than outsider directors, 47 when the firm requires sophisticated gui-
dance regarding unique industry practices.
Finally, the dichotomy between insiders and outsiders may become
blurred over time. Professors Hermalin and Weisbach developed a
model to show that board independence declines over the course of a
CEO's tenure, even though the same independent board composition
stays throughout this period. 48 Professors Hermalin and Weisbach
quote a leading venture capitalist for this phenomenon: "[A]t the end
of the day, most independent directors get neutralized in one fashion
or another. '49
B. Explaining These Academic Findings
The consistent findings that independent boards do not improve
performance except, perhaps, during crisis may seem to be counter-
intuitive. After all, independent directors are supposed to be better
guards for shareholders' interest against executives' abuses because
independent directors are, by definition, not subject to the executives'
control. However, the consistency of the empirical studies suggests
that factors other than independence affect a board's proper monitor-
ing role. This Section seeks to explain why boards often fail to provide
the necessary monitoring desired by shareholders. This Section first
examines characteristics associated with boards in general that tend to
adversely affect their monitoring abilities or incentives. This Section
then examines these characteristics for boards dominated by indepen-
dent directors and explains why these boards do not perform a better
monitoring job except during crisis.
1. Boards in General
At the outset, directors have their own conflict of interest in per-
forming their monitoring role. Unless a firm has a dominant share-
holder who selects its share of directors, most directors are chosen not
by shareholders, but by the firm's executives. 50 As a legal matter, a
47. "[I]nternal managers contribute 'valuable specific information about the organization's
activities."' Klein, supra note 42, at 277 (quoting Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separa-
tion of Ownership and Control, 26 J. LAW & ECON. 301, 304 (1983)).
48. See Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 2, at 111-12.
49. Id. at 111 (quoting Smale et al., Redraw the Line Between the Board and the CEO, HARV.
Bus. REV., Mar./Apr. 1995, at 158).
50. Id. at 96; Bhagat et al., supra note 3, at 887.
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director should represent the shareholders' interest.51 In reality, be-
cause the executives largely determine those who serve as the com-
pany's directors, these directors have a natural tendency to be more
loyal to their appointing party than to their legal constituency.52 A
director gains both monetary compensation in the form of retainer
fees and reputational enhancement by sitting on a company's board.
5 3
If the business world knows a person is likely to be a strong sharehold-
ers' advocate and tough to the executives, the executives are simply
less likely to choose this person as a director candidate.
More importantly, a firm's directors face the same collective action
problem as faced by a large firm's dispersed shareholders. In law and
often in academic studies, we assume that the board is a monolithic
entity.54 But instead, the board is composed of individuals.55 When
there are individuals in a group, collective action problems exist if
each member's pro rata share of the benefit from a particular action is
less than the cost for the individual member. This mismatch of benefit
and cost is often the case for the board of directors except, perhaps,
during crisis.56 The relatively remote benefit to most directors for
monitoring is slight compared with the high cost to each of the indi-
vidual directors.57 Three factors contribute to this mismatch: the
board's non-hierarchical structure, the incentive structure for the di-
rectors, and the board's large size.
Directors are mostly of equal status on the board, unlike a firm's
executives who receive all of the praise and are fully accountable and
responsible for their particular group's performance. Directors often
serve on a board either because of their historical contribution to the
firm or because of their expertise or reputation in a particular field.58
Although many directors are also shareholders of the firm, they do
not necessarily have to own shares. As a result, the benefit to an indi-
vidual director for monitoring is the reputational gain, often slight and
remote, when monitoring improves the firm's performance. The cost
of monitoring to an individual director, by contrast, could be signifi-
cant. As discussed above, directors often owe their job to the execu-
51. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, supra note 8, at 225-26.
52. See Bhagat et al., supra note 3, at 887.
53. See id. at 890-91.
54. Benjamin Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an Endogenously De-
termined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature 20 (unpublished working paper), avail-
able at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/601herma.pdf.
55. Id.
56. See Bhagat et al., supra note 3, at 887-88.
57. Id.
58. Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 54, at 22 n.2.
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tives' discretion. 59 If an individual director is perceived as being
aggressive to the executives, the director may lose the job, the associ-
ated retainer fee, and the reputational enhancement. On the other
hand, if the firm performs poorly, each individual director only bears a
small portion of the blame because all the directors on the board
share the responsibility equally. Perhaps only when the firm exper-
iences a crisis, the proportionate reputational cost to an individual di-
rector justifies that he or she begins to monitor actively.
The incentive structure for the board of directors further aggravates
the collective action problem. Board directors, in general, have lim-
ited time dedicated to monitor. They only work part time, and they do
not get paid based on the number of hours they work.60 Each director
is often paid a fixed annual retainer fee for the director's role.61 Firms
also compensate directors for attending meetings or participating in
special committees. 62 However, the board usually assigns the number
of meetings and committees ahead of time.63 Accordingly, at the be-
ginning of a fiscal year, each director knows relatively certain her
compensation, irrespective of how much additional time the director
needs to spend. Suppose a member of the board desires to monitor
the executives more closely than others. Because the incentive struc-
ture does not award the director based on her performance or extra
effort, over time this director's motivation will likely dwindle.
The large size of most firms' boards is another major contributor to
the collective action problem. Many scholars have suggested that
boards are too large and recommended that firms reduce the board
size.64 Empirical studies consistently find that board size is negatively
correlated with firm performance: the larger the board, the less likely
an individual director needs to take the blame for the firm's poor per-
formance. 65 Further, as a group's size increases, its coordination and
processing skills diminish. 66 Therefore, the larger the board, the more
severe of the collective action problem is within the board, and the
less the board monitors the executives.
59. Bhagat et al., supra note 3, at 887-88; see Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 54, at 10.
60. See Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 9, at 64.
61. John F. Olson & D. Jarrett Arp, The Year of the Proactive Director: Recent Developments
in the Performance and Compensation of Outside Directors, PRACTISING L. INST./CORP. L., Nov.
1995, at 635 app. B.
62. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney 1), 731 A.2d 342, 355 (Del. Ch.
1998).
63. 2 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 398 (2007).
64. See, e.g., Bhagat & Black, supra note 18, at 941-42; Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 9, at 65.
65. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 18, at 941-42; see also April Klein, Economic Determi-
nants of Audit Committee Independence, 77 Accr. REV. 435, 438 (2002).
66. See Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 9, at 65; see also Klein, supra note 42.
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Besides the conflict of interest and collective action problems faced
by a board, executives' strong incentive to entrench the board further
explains board passivity. Executives, for honorable or non-charitable
reasons, wish to receive the trust of the board so that the board will
challenge the executives' decisions as little as possible. When a firm's
performance is good on paper, the board has little incentive or reason
to challenge the executives. As a result, the board, shaped by the exec-
utives, gradually develops into a harmonious atmosphere where the
board significantly defers to the executives and accepts whatever the
executives inform them. Thus, even if the executives lie or commit
fraud in order to present a rosy picture for the firm, the board is un-
likely to step in because the board can hardly detect the fraud. Only
when a firm's performance is poor on paper does the board have any
reason to intervene. Professors Hermalin and Weisbach phrase the sit-
uation: "The more entrenched the CEO is, the less intensely he is
monitored." 67
When all three factors faced by a board-conflict of interest, collec-
tive action problem, and executives' entrenchment tendency-are
combined, it is understandable why boards do not monitor as much as
shareholders desire. Perhaps the strongest incentive for a board to
monitor is the potential of a shareholders' lawsuit against the board
for breach of its fiduciary duty. Yet the current business judgment rule
under state law and the availability of a director's or officer's liability
insurance largely insulate each director from personal liability and,
thus, reduce the board's incentive to monitor.
2. Boards with a Majority of Independent Directors
Independent directors still face the same conflict of interest and col-
lective action problems. Proponents of independent boards had prob-
ably thought that independent directors would face less conflict of
interest issues than insider directors; independent directors do not
work with the executives on a daily basis and do not report to the
CEO. But, in reality, an outsider becomes a director often because the
CEO has chosen the outsider on the nomination slate. Thus, most in-
dependent directors still owe to the CEO for their jobs. This personal
loyalty to the CEO reduces an independent director's incentive to
zealously represent shareholders who are, after all, most likely stran-
gers to the director.
In some sense, the collective action problem is even worse for inde-
pendent directors than insider directors because the benefit of moni-
67. Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 2, at 108.
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toring to an independent director is lower than insider directors, but
the cost of monitoring is higher. Unless an independent director is
also a shareholder, the independent director, by definition, receives
no financial interest in the firm other than the director's retainer fee.68
In contrast, an insider director has a much stronger financial interest
in the firm's performance. An insider may receive bonuses tied to the
firm's performance or promotions because of the insider's extraordi-
nary service as an executive. However, neither bonus nor promotion is
available to an independent director. Moreover, independent direc-
tors must spend more effort than insider directors to get to know the
firm, but the compensation structure does not award the independent
director's extra effort. If a firm's business requires its directors to un-
derstand peculiar insider information specific to the firm, the firm may
require more insiders than independent directors. This explains Gil-
lan's finding that different firms require different insider/outsider
compositions. 69
Perhaps only with regard to the executives' entrenchment indepen-
dent directors may perform better than insider directors. Independent
directors are usually less familiar with the firm's executives than insid-
ers.70 Accordingly, they are better than insiders to resist the CEO's
entrenchment tendency. But it is only a matter of time before inde-
pendent directors are unable to resist this tendency.71 Thus, unless the
independent directors are recently added to the board, the long-ten-
ured independent directors are probably just as passive as the inside
directors. This explains why firms tend to increase independent direc-
tors during times of poor performance. 72 New faces in the boardroom
are less loyal to the firm's executives, more likely to break the harmo-
nious atmosphere, and more prone to challenge the executives. Thus,
they are more likely to remove the CEO for a poor performance.
C. Three Recent Examples of Boards' Monitoring Failures
This Section describes three recent and prominent examples of
boards' monitoring failures, and, in all three examples, the boards had
a majority of independent directors. The Disney board's poor decision
68. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
69. See Gillan et al., supra note 42, at *25-*26; see supra note 44 and accompanying text.
70. Because independent directors, unlike inside directors, are not full-time employees, inde-
pendent directors are also less familiar with the executives.
71. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
72. Actors other than the executives must be responsible for making this change during a
crisis. We don't expect an executive to add a slate of directors who will later remove this execu-
tive. But who the responsible actors are is less clear. Perhaps during a crisis, strong market forces
lead some dominant shareholders to set up.
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to hire Michael Ovitz received significant media attention and re-
sulted in costly shareholders' lawsuits. Because the WorldCom board
was passive and overwhelmed by the dominant CEO, the board re-
mained ignorant while the CEO conducted massive frauds. The Enron
board possessed all the "model" characteristics recommended by the
business world. Yet, it still failed to challenge any of the questionable
accounting schemes that the executives had proposed. The failure of
the WorldCom and Enron boards' monitoring led a panicked Con-
gress to enact SOX, which required all publicly traded companies to
have audit committees composed of independent directors. But inde-
pendent directors already dominated both the WorldCom and the En-
ron boards when the wrongdoings occurred, leaving us to wonder
what positive effect SOX will achieve.
1. Walt Disney Company
The Walt Disney Company's controversy involved the hiring and
firing of Michael Ovitz as Disney's president. In October 1995,
Michael Ovitz and Disney entered into an employment agreement
under which Ovitz would serve as Disney's president for five years.73
Ovitz only served the position for slightly over one year before Disney
terminated Ovitz in December 1996.74 But, under the terms of the
employment agreement, Disney paid Ovitz a total severance payout
valued at approximately $130 million.75 In January 1997, several Dis-
ney shareholders quickly brought derivative actions in the Delaware
Court of Chancery.76 One central claim of these shareholders' lawsuits
was that the Disney board of directors breached its fiduciary duty to
the shareholders when the board inattentively approved the employ-
ment agreement with Ovitz. 77 These litigations lasted for ten years,
and the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed in June 2006 the Chan-
cery Court's judgment in favor of Disney's board. 78 Although two of
Disney's largest individual shareholders supported the hiring deci-
sion, 79 the litigations exposed how a major American corporation's
board "ordinarily" performs its monitoring role on behalf of the
shareholders, even though the majority of the board's directors were
independent.
73. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I), 731 A.2d 342, 352 (Del. Ch. 1998).
74. Id.
75. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney 111), 906 A.2d 27, 35 (Del. 2006).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 75.
79. See id. at 36 n.4, 39 n.10 (Roy Disney and Sid Bass were the two large shareholders who
supported the hiring decision).
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In approving the hiring of Ovitz and the employment agreement,
Disney's board basically followed all of the directions of Michael Eis-
ner, Disney's then-CEO for over ten years. After Disney lost its for-
mer president in a tragic helicopter crash, Eisner began to search for a
successor.80 His primary candidate for the position was Ovitz, with
whom Eisner had enjoyed a social and professional relationship for
nearly twenty-five years.81 Initially, Eisner expressed his desire to hire
Ovitz with the board members on an individual basis.82 Under Dis-
ney's charter, the board was responsible for selecting the corpora-
tion's officers, and a compensation committee was responsible for
establishing and approving salaries for the officers. 83 Disney's board
was composed of fifteen members at that time, eleven of whom quali-
fied as independent directors.8 4 The compensation committee had
four members, three of whom qualified as independent. 85 Accord-
ingly, both the board and the compensation committee were com-
posed of a majority of independent directors. The non-independent
compensation committee member was Irwin E. Russell, who was also
Eisner's personal attorney.86 Eisner and Russell were primarily re-
sponsible for negotiating the terms of the employment agreement with
Ovitz. 87 They later brought in one of the three independent compen-
sation committee members, Raymond Watson, to evaluate a proposed
compensation package for Ovitz. 88 After these members reached an
agreement with Ovitz, they contacted the rest of the two compensa-
tion committee members by phone in order to inform them of the
hiring decision and the terms of the employment agreement.89 Eisner
also informed each of the remaining board members by phone.90 The
80. Disney 111, 906 A.2d at 36.
81. Id
82. Id.
83. Id. at 53.
84. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I), 731 A.2d 342, 356-61 (Del. Ch.
1998). The Delaware Chancery Court considered a director to be independent if that director
can exercise his or her business judgment independent of the CEO's influence. Id. According to
this definition, the court concluded that twelve of the directors were independent. Id. But one of
these twelve directors, Roy E. Disney, was also a top executive at Disney. Id. Accordingly, when
an independent director is defined as "one who has no financial interest in the firm other than
the director's retainer fee," Roy E. Disney does not qualify as an independent director. Id.
85. See Disney 111, 906 A.2d at 40 (describing the names of the compensation committee's
four members); Disney 1, 731 A.2d at 360-61 (one of the compensation committee's members
was Eisner's personal counsel and was not considered an independent director; the court con-
cluded that the other three members all qualified as independent).
86. Disney 1, 731 A.2d at 360-61.
87. Disney 111, 906 A.2d at 36-37.
88. Id. at 38.
89. Id. at 39.
90. Id.
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compensation committee then formally approved the employment
agreement in its one-hour meeting, during which the committee also
considered other agendas.91 Each committee member received a term
sheet at this meeting, but not a draft of the employment agreement. 92
Immediately after the compensation committee meeting, the Disney
board met.93 Eisner led the discussion regarding Ovitz, and Watson
and Russell responded to questions from the rest of the board.94 The
board then formally voted unanimously to elect Ovitz as Disney's new
President.95
Ovitz's tenure at Disney was brief. In September and November
1996, Eisner informed the board during board meetings of the contin-
uing problems with Ovitz's performance. 96 Around the same time,
Eisner worked with Disney's general counsel to consider whether Dis-
ney could dismiss Ovitz for cause, in which case Disney would not be
obligated to pay the $130 million severance to Ovitz under the em-
ployment agreement. 97 But Eisner and the general counsel found that
they could not dismiss Ovitz for cause. 98 Eisner then announced
Ovitz's termination to the public through a press release. 99 Before the
press release was issued, Eisner attempted to inform each of the board
members by telephone of the decision. 00 None of the board members
objected to Ovitz's termination. 10 1 According to the Chancery Court:
Although the board did not meet to vote on the termination,...
most, if not all, of the Disney directors trusted Eisner's and [the
general counsel's] conclusion that there was no cause to terminate
Ovitz, and that Ovitz should be terminated without cause even
though that involved making the costly [severance] payment.10 2
Disney's shareholders who brought the lawsuits unsuccessfully ar-
gued that the compensation committee members breached their fidu-
ciary duty by approving the employment agreement with Ovitz.10 3 The
Delaware court reviewed the board's decision under the business
judgment standard.10 4 Under this standard, "the law presumes that 'in
91. Id. at 40.
92. Disney I11, 906 A.2d at 40.
93. Id. at 41.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 43-44.
97. Disney 1II, 906 A.2d at 43-44.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 45.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Disney I11, 906 A.2d at 43-44.
103. Id. at 51-52, 61-62.
104. Id. at 52.
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making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interests of the company.' 10 5 A plaintiff can
rebut the presumption if "the plaintiff shows that the directors
breached their fiduciary duty of care or of loyalty or acted in bad
faith. ' 10 6 The court adopted a gross negligence standard for the duty
of care determination.10 7 Although the court acknowledged that, in
approving the terms of the employment agreement, the compensation
committee did not follow the "best practices," the court refused to
find that the compensation committee acted in gross negligence. 10 8
According to the court, even though not every member of the com-
mittee reviewed the draft of the employment agreement, each mem-
ber was informed of the substance of the agreement either orally
through other members or through the term sheet.10 9 Thus, because
"the committee had adequately informed itself of the potential magni-
tude of the entire severance package," the committee had not
breached its duty of care. 110 Because the shareholders also unsuccess-
fully argued that the committee members had acted in bad faith"' and
did not argue that the members had breached their duty of loyalty, the
compensation committee's decision was protected under the business
judgment standard. 12
The shareholders' challenge to the board's hiring decision was simi-
larly unsuccessful.1 13 According to the court, because the directors
were informed of all the information reasonably available concerning
Ovitz's hiring, the directors were not grossly negligent in approving
the hire.114
Perhaps the hiring decision was in fact an unfortunate mismatch be-
tween Ovitz and Disney, not the result of the board's negligence. Nev-
ertheless, the Disney litigations provide for us a valuable insider look
into the operations of a major American corporation's board, a board
105. Id. at 45 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
106. Id. at 52.
107. In re Wait Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney 11), 907 A.2d 693, 748, 760 (Del. Ch.
2005).
108. Id. at 697, 760; see also Disney I11, 906 A.2d at 58.
109. Disney 111, 906 A.2d at 58-59.
110. Id. at 58.
111. Id. at 62. In making the bad faith determination, the Delaware Supreme Court approved
the Chancery's definition of bad faith. Under this definition, the "intentional dereliction of duty,
a conscious disregard for one's responsibilities, is an appropriate (although not the only) standard
for determining whether fiduciaries have acted in good faith." Id.
112. See id. at 58.
113. Id. at 61-62, 67-68.
114. Disney I1, 906 A.2d at 61-62.
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with a majority of independent directors. Michael Eisner, the CEO,
was the driving force for the hiring decision and negotiations concern-
ing the employment agreement.11 5 Once Eisner made up his mind, he
only had to contact the rest of the board members individually
through telephone to secure their support. 116 Once Eisner had in-
formed these board members by phone, both the compensation com-
mittee's formal approval and the board's formal unanimous vote were
exceedingly brief.11 7 But the business judgment standard protects a
board's decision from judicial scrutiny as long as the board members
made an informed decision.11 8 The board adequately informed itself,
according to the Delaware court, even though the executives brought
the information informally to the board and the board never even de-
liberated the information.11 9
Moreover, the Disney board's composition confirms the academic
findings that the executives often choose the board members, includ-
ing independent board members. As discussed above, at the time
when the board approved to hire Ovitz, eleven of the board's fifteen
members qualified as independent directors. 120 Of these eleven inde-
pendent directors, the Delaware court cited at least five that had
maintained personal relationships with Eisner outside of their direc-
torship: two were Disney's retired executives;1 21 one was the president
of Georgetown University, which had received over one million dol-
lars in donations from Eisner;12 2 one was counsel to a law firm re-
tained by Disney;123 and one was the principal of the elementary
school where Eisner's children had attended. 124 Through these rela-
tionships, we can understand how these directors could have paid nat-
ural deference to Eisner.
2. WorldCom
WorldCom's accounting scandal in 2002 shocked the world and led
to major changes in accounting, business, and legal communities. Un-
like the Enron scandal discussed below, WorldCom, under the leader-
ship of its then CEO, Bernard Ebbers, had engaged in outright fraud
115. Id. at 36.
116. Id. at 39.
117. Id. at 40-41.
118. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
119. Disney 111, 906 A.2d at 58-59.
120. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
121. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney 1), 731 A.2d 342, 356 (Del. Ch. 1998).
122. Id. at 359.
123. Id. at 360.
124. Id. at 359.
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from 1999 to 2002.125 It underreported its major costs by capitalizing
these costs instead of expensing them.126 It also inflated revenues with
bogus accounting entries. 127 Overall, WorldCom had inflated its total
assets by approximately eleven billion dollars through fraud.128 Al-
though these frauds lasted for over three years, WorldCom's board of
directors appeared to have been completely ignorant of the fraud.1 29
The ignorance of WorldCom's board was due to the board's passiv-
ity and the strong dominance of Ebbers over the board. Ebbers co-
founded WorldCom's predecessor in 1983 and grew WorldCom
through a series of acquisitions in the 1990s. During most of the pe-
riod when WorldCom committed frauds, the board had fifteen mem-
bers.130 Except for Ebbers and Scott Sullivan, WorldCom's then-CFO,
the rest of the thirteen members all qualified as independent directors.
Almost all of these thirteen independent directors were individuals
who had been owners, officers, or directors of companies WorldCom
had acquired in the past.131 These WorldCom directors received both
cash and stock options, with overall compensation heavily weighted
toward the latter. 132 For cash compensation, the directors received a
fixed annual retainer fee of $35,000, plus fees for each board or com-
mittee meeting attended. 33 Besides stock option compensation, many
directors owned significant amounts of WorldCom stock because
these directors had held substantial stakes in companies acquired by
WorldCom.134 The board conducted most of its functions as a formal-
ity. It held regular meetings between four and six times a year and
special meetings as needed. 35 The meetings followed a consistent for-
mat, and Ebbers dominated all the meetings.' 36 Each meeting opened
with a prayer followed by a series of presentations. 137 Then the chair-
man of each special committee reported on its committee issues. 138
125. SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMM. OF THE BOARD OF DIRS. OF WORLDCOM, INC., REPORT
OF INVESTIGATION 1 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723527/0000931
76303001862/dex991.htm [hereinafter WORLDCOM REPORT].
126. Id. at 9-13.
127. Id. at 13-16.
128. Daniel Kadlec, Next: WorldCom's $11 Billion Case, TIME, Mar. 15, 2004, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,993586,00.html.
129. WORLDCOM REPORT, supra note 125, at 29.
130. Id. 265.
131. Id. at 264-65.
132. Id. at 266.
133. Id.
134. WORLDCOM REPORT, supra note 125, at 267.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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The meetings discussed financial matters at high level. But, according
to the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of
WorldCom,-formed by WorldCom's new board after the scandal-
these high-level discussions of financial matters were consistent with
the practice of most boards during the same period. 139 Each of the
special committees apparently adopted a "hand-off" approach to their
commitments, largely adopting recommendations by Ebbers. 140 The
Special Investigative Committee summarized the board's role as the
following:
The Board of Directors does not appear to have known of the
fraud, nor did it receive information we believe should have put it
on notice. However, the Board was so passive and reliant on Ebbers
and Sullivan that it had little opportunity to learn of the fraud....
The outside Directors had little or no involvement in the
Company's business other than through attendance at Board
meetings....
[They] had virtually no interaction with Company operational or
financial employees other than during the presentations they heard
at meetings. While in this respect the Directors were far from
unique among directors of large corporations, this lack of contact
meant that they had little sense of the culture within the Company,
or awareness of issues other than those brought to them by a few
senior managers....
Ebbers was autocratic in his dealings with the Board, and the
Board permitted it. With limited exceptions, the members of the
Board were reluctant to challenge Ebbers even when they disagreed
with him. They, like most observers, were impressed with the Com-
pany's growth and Ebbers' [sic] reputation, although they were in
some cases mystified or perplexed by his style. This was Ebbers'
[sic] company. 141
While WorldCom's accounting fraud may have been one of the few
unfortunate incidences among the country's numerous corporations,
WorldCom board's passivity in performing its monitoring role is far
from unique, as the Special Investigative Committee's report fre-
quently noted.142 But for the general norm requiring a board of direc-
tors, WorldCom may not have even needed a board. After all, the
board appeared to have provided no value to the corporation or to the
139. WORLDCOM REPORT, supra note 125, at 267-68.
140. See id. at 272.
141. Id. at 7, 30-32.
142. See, e.g., id. at 31, 267-68, 290.
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shareholders; instead, it caused the corporation to spend money on its
valueless formality.
3. Enron
Enron's accounting scandal sent similar shockwaves throughout the
world. Unlike WorldCom's outright accounting fraud, Enron engaged
in a series of convoluted and questionable high-risk accounting prac-
tices to conceal its debts and to boost its assets.143 While WorldCom's
fraud had caused its demise, it is not clear whether the fraud had
caused Enron's demise or whether Enron's aggressive business model
had caused its fraud. In the 1990s, Enron had transitioned from a
traditional energy company with pipelines and power plants to a high-
tech enterprise that traded energy contracts. 144 Trading energy con-
tracts exposed Enron's assets to risk fluctuations. In order to avoid the
fluctuations from affecting Enron's credit rating, Enron established a
series of affiliated companies to own its debts. 145 But Enron owned
less than 50% of these entities so it would not need to consolidate
these entities' books.146 By 2000, Enron had lodged $27 billion debts
in these unconsolidated affiliates.1 47 Also unlike the WorldCom fraud,
of which the WorldCom board appeared to be ignorant, the Enron
board was aware of and approved these accounting schemes, even
though the board members claimed that they did not consider the
schemes to be fraudulent. 148 According to several of Enron's direc-
tors, they knew "the company was engaged in high-risk and innovative
transactions" and "Enron was engaged in complex accounting and was
operating in areas with few established accounting guidelines.' 49
Thus, because the directors thought that Enron "was engaged in busi-
ness transactions that had 'not been done by many companies in the
143. See SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMM. OF THE BOARD OF DIRS. OF ENRON CORP., REPORT
OF INVESTIGATION 36 (2002) 36-40, available at http://fll.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/
docs/enron/sicreport/sicreport020102.pdf [hereinafter ENRON INVESTIOATION].
144. S. REP. No. 107-70, at 6 (2002), available at http://fll.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/
hdocs/docs/enron/senpsi708O2rpt.pdf [hereinafter ENRON BOARD ROLE].
145. Id. at 7-8; ENRON INVESTIGATION, supra note 143, at 36.
146. ENRON INVESTIGATION, supra note 143, at 5. Enron engaged in a number of transactions
involving an accounting structure known as a special purpose entity ("SPE"). Id. A company
that does business with an SPE may treat the SPE as an outside entity for accounting purposes.
Id. To qualify as an SPE, an independent owner must exercise control over the SPE, i.e., owning
more than 50% of the voting stock of the SPE. Id.
147. ENRON BOARD ROLE, supra note, 144, at 8.
148. See id. at 8, 14-24.
149. Id. at 19-20.
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world' and were 'relatively new,"' they did not consider the account-
ing schemes to be questionable.1 50
Superficially, Enron's board maintained a number of practices that
a Delaware court would consider to be "best practices."'151 It had fif-
teen members, many of whom served on the boards of other compa-
nies.152 Former Chairman of Enron's Executive Committee described
members of the board as well-educated, "experienced, successful busi-
nessmen and women" and "experts in areas of finance and account-
ing."'153 One of the directors was a former dean and an accounting
professor at the Stanford Business School.154 All of the directors de-
scribed internal board relations as harmonious. 155 They could recall
only two instances over the course of many years when board votes
were not unanimous. 156 They also described a good working relation-
ship with Enron management because the directors possessed great
respect for senior Enron officers, trusting the integrity and compe-
tency of the officers who were later indicted.157 The board was organ-
ized into five committees. 158 One of the committees was the Audit and
Compliance Committee, which reviewed Enron's accounting and
compliance programs and approved Enron's financial statements and
reports. 159 The board normally held five regular meetings per year,
with additional special meetings as needed. 60 Each board meeting
usually lasted two days, during which the committees also held meet-
ings. 161 During the committee meetings, Enron management generally
provided presentations on a variety of company issues. 162 Enron also
organized trips abroad during which board members viewed company
assets and operations.163 But overall, the board members maintained a
routine contact with less than a dozen senior officers at Enron. 164
Each board member was compensated with cash and stock.165 The to-
tal cash and equity compensation of Enron board members in 2000
150. Id. at 20 (quoting Lord Wakeham).
151. See supra Part II.C.1.
152. ENRON BOARD ROLE, supra note, 144, at 8.
153. Id. Only one of the fifteen board members was a woman. See id. at 1.
154. Id. at 2.
155. Id. at 8.
156. Id.
157. ENRON BOARD ROLE, supra note 144, at 8.
158. Id. at 8.
159. Id. at 9.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. ENRON BOARD ROLE, supra note 144, at 10.
163. Id. at 9.
164. Id. at 10.
165. Id. at 11.
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was about $350,000, more than twice the national average for board
compensation at a U.S. publicly traded corporation. 166
Unlike the WorldCom board, which had a strong CEO who often
intimidated the rest of the board, Enron's board did not appear to
have had such a dominant figure. But, at the end of the day, the board
relied on what the executives informed them of, relied on the per-
ceived "integrity" and "competence" of the executives, and relied on
the "clean" audit opinions from Enron's auditor, Arthur Andersen. 167
The U.S. Senate's Subcommittee found extensive evidence showing
the board was aware that Enron was engaged in questionable account-
ing practices. 168 But Enron directors apparently never challenged the
executives' decisions even when the directors received alarming infor-
mation. 169 For example, when Enron created a series of special pur-
pose entities to own Enron's debts, Enron had to have "unaffiliated"
people to own these entities. 170 Instead of finding a truly independent
investor, Enron's CFO or the CFO's subordinates owned the enti-
ties. 171 Even though each entity involved hundreds of millions of dol-
lars of Enron's investment, the directors did not feel troubled by the
conflicts of interest posed because they relied on the executives to
develop and implement the day-to-day controls.172 The directors were
satisfied with their infrequent and generalized reviews about these en-
tities, guided by the executives' presentations. 73 After one of the spe-
cial entities had operated for more than one year, the Compensation
Committee sought to review the CFO's compensation from the special
entity.1 74 The Chairman of the Compensation Committee requested
this information from Enron's senior compensation officer, but the of-
ficer failed to deliver for more than one year, until the Wall Street
Journal published the compensation. 75 During this one year, no other
board member took steps to obtain the information. 176
Not only did the Enron board rely on the executives, they probably
also relied on each other. The board's large size filled with highly ex-
perienced business people aggravated the collective action problem.
Perhaps each of them thought the following: "If Famous Person One
166. Id.
167. ENRON BOARD ROLE, supra note 144, at 8, 14, 24.
168. Id. at 8, 14-24.
169. See id at 26-29.
170. See supra note 146.
171. ENRON BOARD ROLE, supra note 144, at 24.
172. Id. at 29.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 34.
175. Id. at 35.
176. ENRON BOARD ROLE, supra note 144, at 35.
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is not challenging the transaction, why should I be concerned and
break the harmonious atmosphere that has long existed in the boar-
droom?" A large board filled with highly paid and highly successful
people may have appeared impressive to the outside world, but, in
reality, may have been a detriment to shareholders. Such a prestigious
board not only costs significantly more money to maintain but is also
much more inefficient to operate. The board probably did not contrib-
ute to Enron's initial success since Enron's executives probably cre-
ated Enron's business models. In this sense, the board's sophistication
may have simply been a faqade, constructed with a hefty price to con-
ceal its true uselessness. The five separate committees within the
board all had fancy names. 177 But, if all they did was passively approve
of the executives' proposals, a board may have performed far more
superiorly if it had only three ordinary business people, instead of
highly successful ones. Suppose board jobs for publicly traded corpo-
rations do not belong exclusively to a small community of elite mem-
bers, and ordinary workers would compete based on their abilities and
dedication in order to serve on a board. This open competition for
board jobs would be more likely to produce more efficient and active
boards.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE STATE LAW TO IMPROVE
BOARDS' MONITORING
According to Professors Bhagat, Carey, and Elson, Delaware
courts' decisions favoring independent and disinterested directors
"have led not to more effective management oversight but, instead, to
a classic triumph of form over function - where, although prescribed
procedure has been followed, decisionmaking appears to be little
more than staged play-acting, absent critical engaged oversight.' 178
Boards of directors at Disney, WorldCom, Enron, and countless
others have confirmed these professors' statement. Court reviews of
challenged corporate decisions in Delaware have generally focused on
a narrow set of transactions and sought to require boards to adopt
procedural safeguards only for these transactions. 179 Because of this
focus on certain transactions instead of on the broader board opera-
177. See id. at 9. The Enron Board had five committees: the Executive Committee, the Fi-
nance Committee, the Audit and Compliance Committee, the Compensation Committee, and
the Nominating Committee. Id.
178. Bhagat et al., supra note 3, at 918.
179. These transactions generally involve situations that are prone to potential conflicts be-
tween the board and shareholders. Examples are self-dealing transactions, transactions involving
a controlling shareholder and the corporation, transactions concerning director or management
compensation, and merger and acquisition transactions. See generally WILLIAM T. ALLEN &
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tion in general, Delaware law has not been effective at improving
board passivity. Instead, boards react with costly procedures only to
circumvent the court's scrutiny for this narrow set of transactions. On
the other hand, federal encroachment into state law, such as the SOX
legislation, not only has no positive effect in corporate boards but also
intrudes into an area of state law whose flexibility has been one of
American law's geniuses. 180 This Part briefly summarizes why the
SOX legislation is unlikely to bring positive changes to the board-
room. It then proposes that the Delaware courts continue their cur-
rent wave of enhancing the good faith jurisprudence by applying the
doctrine broadly to the general board operation instead of focusing
solely on the particular board transaction that's the subject of
litigation.
A. Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Costly but Fruitless Federal Legislation
Partly because of the inadequate safeguarding provided by state
law, the federal government, in response to the market outcry over
Enron, WorldCom, and a series of other large corporate scandals, hur-
ried in and produced SOX. 8 1 But, as Professor Romano convincingly
argued, the procedure imposed by SOX is unlikely to bring any posi-
tive effect for corporate governance. 8 2 A central mandate of SOX is
all publicly traded companies must have audit committees composed
entirely of independent directors. 18 3 Such an independent audit com-
mittee is unlikely to be effective, but it is likely to be extremely costly.
Professor Romano summarized in her article a large number of litera-
ture examining the impact of the audit committee's independence on
firm performance and on financial statement misconduct. 184 The com-
pelling conclusion from this literature is that requiring audit commit-
tees to consist solely of independent directors will not reduce the
probability of financial statement wrongdoing or improve firm
performance.185
The discussion in Section II.B and the Disney, WorldCom, and En-
ron examples help explain why audit committees with solely indepen-
dent directors will not achieve what Congress intended. Arguments in
REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
285-348, 463-95 (2003).
180. See Romano, Corporate Law, supra note 21, at 313.
181. Romano, Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 13, at 1523.
182. Id. at 1529-43.
183. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 775-77 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 78j-1).
184. Romano, Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 13, at 1530-33.
185. Id. at 1533.
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favor of independent directors assume that these directors are less
likely to defer to the executives and, accordingly, more likely to find
out wrongdoings and provide more monitoring than inside directors.
But WorldCom and Enron's boards failed to adequately monitor the
executives not because the directors were not independent, but be-
cause directors have a natural tendency to stay passive and to defer to
the executives' decisions. Independent directors, contrary to what
Congress wants to believe, are actually more likely to stay passive
than inside directors. They are not full-time corporate employees and
most likely do not depend on the corporation's success for their liveli-
hood. Their compensation structure does not award them to spend
more time than the fixed number of meetings they need to attend.
Further, independent directors need to spend more time than inside
directors to learn about the firm. Unless directors see clear evidence
of wrongdoing or face an already exposed corporate crisis, they have a
natural tendency to rely on the executives' representation. Moreover,
people serve on audit committees not because they will be likely to
arduously search for potential wrongdoings. Rather, directors will
wish to develop a collegial, not adversary, relationship with the execu-
tives. After all, a director's job is much easier when he or she does not
need to constantly challenge the executives. Therefore, even if inde-
pendent directors on day one may not always say yes to the execu-
tives, over time, their initial alertness will gradually fade away. And
"at the end of the day, most independent directors get neutralized in
one fashion or another. '186
Not only will SOX not achieve what Congress intended, a further
problem with SOX is it encroaches into a regulatory regime that had
long belonged to the states. The "genius of U.S. corporate law," prior
to SOX, had been that "corporations can choose their legal regime
from the 50 states and the District of Columbia. ' 18 7 If one state's law
creates a substantial burden on a firm, the firm will simply incorporate
in a different state. Moreover, as discussed in Section II.A, different
firms require different board structures to best fit the particular firm's
business and special demand. Under a uniform federal statute, firms
have no easy way to escape, even if the statute is extremely inefficient,
unless these firms choose to delist.
186. Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 48, at 111.
187. Romano, Corporate Law, supra note 21, at 313.
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B. A Proposal to Delaware Courts: Expand the Good Faith Review
Absent changes at the state level, Congress, however, may not be
willing to repeal SOX.188 After all, SOX is Congress's response to a
spate of accounting scandals that shattered public confidence in the
securities market.'8 9 Although it is a poor means to an end, the threat
of a negative political image may cause Congress hesitance to admit
its fault in the short term. At the same time, the gap between corpo-
rate reality and state law's assumptions leaves most people unsatisfied
with the current form of corporate governance. Perhaps judicial over-
sight alone is insufficient to transform corporate governance, but case
law's insistence in a certain direction can and, in fact, often does lead
to positive changes in people's behavior. Delaware is the pioneer and
leader in corporate law. 190 Delaware courts, for the most part, have
restrained themselves from "intervening" into corporate business de-
cisions. From time to time, when corporate scandals loom in the pub-
lic mind, Delaware courts do react to strengthen their oversight of the
board. For example, during the acquisition frenzy period in 1980s,
Delaware courts issued a series of opinions, imposing various proce-
dures and duties in the merger and acquisition area.191 In recent years,
commentators have noticed that the Delaware courts have not been
completely unresponsive to the spade of accounting scandals. 192 The
emphasis on "good faith" in the Disney opinions suggests that Dela-
ware judges are eager to develop a suitable judicial doctrine to en-
hance their oversight over board conduct without unduly interfering
with corporate business matters. 193 This Section proposes that the
Delaware court adopts an expansive good faith review for overall
board operations instead of focusing solely on the particular board
decision that leads to the litigation. The "good faith" doctrine is par-
ticularly suitable to take into account the three negative factors identi-
fied in this Article that affect board monitoring: board members'
conflict of interest, the collective action problem, and executives' en-
trenchment incentive over board members.
Subsection III.B.1 lays out the expansive good faith evaluation pro-
posed. This Subsection also briefly describes the business judgment
rule and the main justifications for this rule. The following two Sub-
188. See Romano, Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 13, at 1602.
189. Romano, Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 13, at 1523, 1525.
190. See Romano, Corporate Law, supra note 21, at 317.
191. See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate
Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 58-61 (2005).
192. See id. at 44-46.
193. Id. at 52.
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sections explain why the expansive good faith evaluation will not in-
terfere with these justifications for the business judgment rule. The
last Subsection applies the expansive good faith evaluation to the Dis-
ney example described in Subsection II.C.1 above.
1. The Good Faith Exception to the Business Judgment Rule
Under Delaware law, board directors traditionally face two types of
fiduciary duties: the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. 194 The duty
of loyalty mainly deals with self-dealing transactions. 195 It requires a
corporate director or officer who enters a transaction with the corpo-
ration to "fully disclose all material facts to the corporation's disinter-
ested representatives and to deal with the company on terms that are
intrinsically fair in all respects."'196 The duty of care requires a director
to perform his or her functions (1) in good faith, (2) in a manner the
director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corpora-
tion, and (3) with the care that a person in a like position would rea-
sonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances. 197 Although
the duty of care standard reads similar to an ordinary negligence stan-
dard in tort law, courts have long introduced the business judgment
rule to insulate directors' performance from judicial scrutiny in most
situations. 198 Under the business judgment rule, the law presumes that
"in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the ac-
tion taken was in the best interests of the company."1 99
Courts and scholars have identified two principal justifications for
the business judgment rule: (1) a negligence standard deters risk tak-
ing by corporate officers and directors, a situation shareholders do not
prefer;200 and (2) judges are not business experts.20' In addition to
194. Id. at 9; see also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
195. Griffith, supra note 191, at 9-10.
196. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 179, at 285.
197. REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr § 8.30 (2002).
198. Griffith, supra note 191, at 10-11 n.21.
199. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.
(Disney Ill), 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006).
200. See Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996). There, the court
noted:
Shareholders can diversify the risks of their corporate investments. Thus, it is in their
economic interest for the corporation to accept in rank order all positive net present
value investment projects available to the corporation, starting with the highest risk
adjusted rate of return first. Shareholders don't want (or shouldn't rationally want) di-
rectors to be risk averse.
Id. (emphasis in original).
201. This justification first appeared in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich.
1919).
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these two justifications, Professor Bainbridge, a strong proponent of
the business judgment rule, has identified an additional justification:
judicial review of business decisions could "interfere with-or even
destroy-the internal team governance structures that regulate board
behavior. 202
Significantly, to allow the business judgment rule to apply, a direc-
tor must have acted in good faith. 20 3 A plaintiff can rebut the business
judgment presumption by showing that a director breached the duty
of care or duty of loyalty, or the director acted in bad faith.20 4 If the
plaintiff successfully rebuts this presumption, the burden shifts to the
director-defendant "to demonstrate that the challenged act or transac-
tion was entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders. 20 5 This
good faith requirement is codified in several provisions of the Dela-
ware General Corporation Law (DGCL). Under Section 102(b)(7) of
the DGCL, Delaware corporations, in their charter provisions, can ex-
culpate their directors from monetary liability for a breach of the duty
of care, provided that the directors acted in good faith.20 6 Section 145
of the DGCL allows Delaware corporations to indemnify directors for
the costs and outcomes of litigation, provided that the directors acted
in good faith.207
Prior to the Disney litigations, this good faith requirement occurred
in case law only occasionally. In Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
the Delaware Supreme Court specifically referred to a director's
"triad of fiduciary duties": "to rebut the [business judgment] presump-
tion, a shareholder plaintiff assumes the burden of providing evidence
that the board of directors, in reaching its challenged decision,
breached any one of its triad of fiduciary duties: good faith, loyalty, or
due care. '208 Scholars have counted at least a dozen Delaware cases,
decided prior to Disney, that adopted the "triad of fiduciary du-
ties. '209 However, Delaware courts had not extensively addressed the
exact meaning of good faith until in Disney.
202. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine 45 (Univ. of
Cal., Los Angeles Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 03-18), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=429260.
203. See supra note 199.
204. Disney I1, 906 A.2d at 52 (Del. 2006).
205. Id.
206. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2008).
207. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8. § 145 (2008).
208. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1164 (Del. 1995) (emphasis in
original).
209. See Charles Hansen, Sowing the Seeds of Confusion: The Ephemeral Triad, 73 ASPEN L.
& Bus. CORP. 1, 2 (2002); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 12 (2006).
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In the Disney litigations, the issue of good faith played a prominent
role.210 In the trial court, Chancellor Chandler referred to the good
faith issue in the negative and asked whether the directors had acted
in bad faith.211 Chancellor Chandler then went on to define bad faith:
Upon long and careful consideration, I am of the opinion that the
concept of intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for
one's responsibilities, is an appropriate (although not the only) stan-
dard for determining whether fiduciaries have acted in good faith.
Deliberate indifference and inaction in the face of a duty to act is, in
my mind, conduct that is clearly disloyal to the corporation. It is the
epitome of faithless conduct. 212
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court provided three categories of
fiduciary behavior as "candidates for the 'bad faith' pejorative la-
bel. '213 The first category "involves so-called 'subjective bad faith,'
that is, fiduciary conduct motivated by an actual intent to do harm.
214
The court refers to this conduct as the "classic, quintessential bad
faith. ' 215 The second category is the most confusing because the con-
duct "involves lack of due care-that is, fiduciary action taken solely
by reason of gross negligence and without any malevolent intent.
216
The court took pains to explain that, in a psychological sense, "[tihe
conduct that is the subject of due care may overlap with the conduct
that comes within the rubric of good faith. '217 But as a legal matter,
according to the court, the two standards are not the same. Thus,
"grossly negligent conduct, without more, does not and cannot consti-
tute a breach of the fiduciary duty to act in good faith. '218 Yet the
court does not clarify what conduct in addition to gross negligence
constitutes bad faith. The third category of conduct not in good faith,
according to the Delaware Supreme Court, is the type defined by
Chancellor Chandler, i.e., "intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious
disregard for one's responsibilities. ' 219 Different wordings aside, the
third category appears to be a specific example of the second cate-
gory. When directors consciously disregard their responsibilities, their
conduct should also have been grossly negligent. Thus, this "conscious
210. Disney 111, 906 A.2d at 63.
211. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney 11), 907 A.2d 693, 753 (Del. Ch. 2005).
212. Disney 11, 907 A.2d at 755 (emphasis in original).
213. Disney 11, 906 A.2d at 64.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 65.
218. Disney I11, 906 A.2d at 65.
219. Id. at 66 (emphasis omitted).
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disregarding" attitude appears to be the extra behavior on top of gross
negligence that makes the conduct not in good faith.
Although the Delaware Supreme Court attempted to provide
"some conceptual guidance to the corporate community" 220 through
the above analysis, the court's three categories are far from clear. Per-
haps, as Professor Griffith argued, this focus on good faith in recent
Delaware cases is simply rhetoric in Delaware corporate law jurispru-
dence in response to the scandals in recent years. 221 According to Pro-
fessor Griffith, the good faith analysis "operates as a speech act, a
performance, as opposed to a careful method of analysis. '222 Once the
crisis and scandals fade away in the public mind, Professor Griffith
predicts that the court will return to the old position of board
deference.223
However, to recapture Delaware's dominance in corporate law
from the federal intrusion and to establish the law's positive role in
shaping corporate governance, Delaware judges should not treat this
"good faith" analysis as temporal rhetoric in crisis time. Instead, the
duty of good faith should be expanded to cover problematic board
conduct that falls outside the traditional duties of care and loyalty. As
discussed in Part II, boards have a tendency to stay passive because:
(1) directors have a conflict of interest; that is, their loyalty is to the
executives, not shareholders; (2) directors have their own collective
action problem among themselves; and (3) executives have a natural
tendency to entrench the board. Neither the traditional duty of care
nor duty of loyalty analysis addresses these issues because the tradi-
tional analysis focuses on a specific board action or inaction that is the
subject of litigation. Surely directors for publicly traded companies
have a busy life and have to consider a variety of different agendas for
the firm. The business judgment rule prevents judges from falling into
the hindsight bias. Without the business judgment rule, a judge may,
ex post, require directors to have considered one business decision
more thoroughly than others just because this decision turned out to
become the subject of litigation. Accordingly, judges impose a low
threshold for directors to pass their fiduciary duty obligations: a board
decision passes muster as long as directors made the decision on an
informed basis and in good faith. A director only needs to "know the
facts" to be able to make a decision on "an informed basis."
220. Id. at 64.
221. See Griffith, supra note 191.
222. Id. at 1.
223. Id. at 2.
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Instead of focusing on a specific transaction in dispute, I propose
that the court expand its review of board operations by examining
how the board generally performs its monitoring role. The court
should allow plaintiffs to show, under the good faith prong, that the
board has been operating in a way so passive that the board almost
always casually disposes all the corporate matters or defers to the ex-
ecutives. Because if, in general, the board casually performs its moni-
toring role, it could not have properly deliberated the particular board
decision in dispute. In this situation, the business judgment presump-
tion does not apply, and the burden shifts to the defendant to prove
that the particular board decision in the dispute was fair to the corpo-
ration and to the shareholders. 224 This expansive review for board op-
erations also fits in Chancellor Chandler's "intentional dereliction of
duty, a conscious disregard for one's responsibilities" test.225 After all,
if board directors generally disregard their responsibilities, they could
not have thoroughly considered the particular board action in dispute.
Under this expansive board review, the court should examine board
operations both on an individual director's basis and on the whole
board. On an individual director's basis, the court should ask, in gen-
eral, whether each board director has performed his or her monitoring
role and how he or she has approved major business decisions. For
example, the court should examine the time and effort each director
devotes into the firm's business; how much each director knows about
the firm and the matters he or she had to decide; how each director
approves a transaction; and whether a director always blindly follows
the executives' recommendation or his or her colleagues' lead without
providing independent input.
224. Note that this test is more expansive than the tests in Graham and Caremark. In Graham
v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963), the corporation and four of its
mid-level managers pled guilty to price-fixing charges, causing big fines imposed on the corpora-
tion. Id. Corporate shareholders brought a derivative suit against directors and top officers, al-
leging that the directors and officers failed to take actions designed to learn of and prevent such
antitrust violations by corporate employees. Id. The court held that the directors were not liable
because the plaintiffs had shown no evidence that had put the directors on notice that employees
had engaged in conduct violating antitrust laws. Id. In In re Caremark International Inc. Deriva-
tive Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), lower-level officers engaged in misconduct violat-
ing the Anti-Referral Payments Law that cost $250 million fines to the corporation. Id. Although
the court found that the directors have an obligation (an affirmative duty) to ensure the corpora-
tion's reporting system is adequate, the court did not find that the directors were liable because
the corporation's information systems appear to have represented a good faith attempt to be
informed of the relevant facts from its employees. Id. In both Graham and Caremark, the courts
still focused on only the boards' inaction surrounding the particular misconduct that damaged
the corporation. Graham, 188 A.2d 125; Caremark, 698 A.2d 959. The courts in those two cases
did not look at the boards' operation in general, beyond the damaging misconduct.
225. See supra note 219.
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To the board as a whole, the court should evaluate the overall at-
mosphere within the board and be sensitive to the executives' en-
trenchment tendency. Chancellor Chandler acknowledges in Disney
that the good faith prong is particularly suitable when a corporation is
governed by an "imperial CEO":
It is precisely in this context-an imperial CEO or controlling share-
holder with a supine or passive board-that the concept of good faith
may prove highly meaningful. The fiduciary duties of care and loy-
alty, as traditionally defined, may not be aggressive enough to pro-
tect shareholder interests when the board is well advised, is not
legally beholden to the management or a controlling shareholder
and when the board does not suffer from other disabling conflicts of
interest, such as a patently self-dealing transaction. Good faith may
serve to fill this gap and ensure that the persons entrusted by share-
holders to govern Delaware corporations do so with an honesty of
purpose and with an understanding of whose interests they are
there to protect.226
Without evaluating the general atmosphere at the board and looking
beyond the particular transaction in dispute, the court may not have
sufficient evidence to be able to label a dominant executive as the
"imperial CEO." When evaluating overall board operations, the court
should focus on how the executives in general approach board mem-
bers. For example, does the board have an executive so dominant that
the directors regularly have been unable or unwilling to challenge the
executive? Does the executive normally approach and inform the
board on an individual basis or on a collective basis? Does the execu-
tive constantly play politics around board members, attempting to tai-
lor to individual directors' personal interest in order to achieve what
the executive desires? Is the board's atmosphere professional and con-
ducive to productive decision making? Taking these factors into con-
sideration will help curtail executives' entrenchment tendency.
Although judges do not wish to mandate how the board conducts its
business, evaluating the board's general atmosphere does not intrude
into directors' decision making but may push boards into building a
more active and productive environment.
2. An Expansive Good Faith Evaluation Is Not Counterproductive
Allowing the plaintiffs to show board passivity beyond the transac-
tion in dispute should not deter directors' risk taking or discourage
qualified individuals from serving on the board. One of the main justi-
fications for the business judgment rule is that judicial challenge to
226. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I1), 907 A.2d 693, 761 n.487 (Del. Ch.
2005) (emphasis in original).
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directors' decisions ex post deters directors' risk taking.227 Corporate
officers and directors invest other people's money. Shareholders can
eliminate firm-specific risk by diversifying their portfolio so they pre-
fer optimal risk taking by corporate officers and directors. 228 In the
absence of the business judgment rule, corporate officers and direc-
tors would bear the full costs of the downside of a risky project, but
they would receive only a small fraction of the gains from the upside
of the risky project.229 Accordingly, judges have invoked the business
judgment rule to prevent themselves from falling into the inevitable
hindsight bias when second-guessing a corporate decision. A more ex-
pansive good faith evaluation, however, should not deter directors'
risk taking any more than the current transactional approach. Under
the expansive approach, judges do not scrutinize more thoroughly
than under the current approach for the particular board decision in
dispute. Instead, judges simply expand the horizon, looking beyond
the transaction and evaluating the board operation in general. The
weakness under the transactional approach is that it isolates one
transaction from the board's overall operation. When the board con-
siders a business matter ex ante, it may not know exactly how the
decision will affect the business, or the board may have reasonably
overlooked the importance of its decision; that is, the decision may
turn out to be more important than the board initially considered.
Thus, unless the plaintiffs bring strong evidence of directors' self-deal-
ing or gross negligence in this one transaction, the plaintiffs are un-
likely to succeed in their claims. Facts surrounding one transaction
often are too limited to prove that the directors have consciously dis-
regarded their duties. Under the expansive good faith evaluation,
however, if the pattern of the board operation shows that the directors
almost always casually dispose their duties and always blindly follow
the executives' recommendations, then the plaintiffs may succeed in
their claims.
Corporate boards consider a variety of business matters. Without
showing how the board operates over a number of matters, plaintiffs
can hardly show that the board has consciously disregarded its duties.
At the same time, judges still do not impose their own business ideas
when evaluating the board's overall operation. Judges will simply
evaluate whether the pattern of board operation demonstrates that it
227. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 cmt. d at 141 (1994); Bainbridge, supra note 202, at 29.
228. See Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996); Bainbridge.,
supra note 202, at 31.
229. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 179, at 241.
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was passive or active. Thus, this expansive good faith evaluation
should not deter directors' risk taking.
Moreover, the expansive good faith approach should not deter
qualified individuals from serving on the board. On the contrary, qual-
ified individuals may have more incentive to serve as directors under
the expansive approach than under the transactional approach. Judges
are more likely to respect a director's decision when the director con-
sistently and diligently serves his or her monitoring role, even if one
unfortunate decision resulted in significant losses. Furthermore, be-
cause judges under the expansive approach are particularly sensitive
to the general atmosphere at the board and the entrenchment ten-
dency of the executives, corporate boards may have more pressure to
develop into an active and productive environment. Qualified individ-
uals should be more encouraged to serve on a board that treasures
each board member's input rather than one that blindly defers to the
executives. Under the expansive approach, corporate boards may ac-
tually have the incentive to evaluate their own monitoring behaviors
on a regular basis.
On the other hand, a qualified individual may and should hesitate
to serve on a board similar to the WorldCom board described above.
The WorldCom board played virtually no role in the company's suc-
cess or failure. 230 It had an autocratic CEO, and directors almost
never challenged him.231 Certainly that board did not treasure any of
its director's expertise, and, if the court adopts the expansive good
faith review, individuals serving on that type of board should have felt
uncomfortable about failing their fiduciary duties.
Professor Bainbridge has argued for an additional justification for
the business judgment rule: judicial review of business decisions could
interfere with the board's internal dynamics. 232 He argues that the
board of directors is a relational team and that members of this team
"develop idiosyncratic working relationships with one another. ' 233
The team also develops its specific human capital and idiosyncratic
internal review and monitoring processes for its members. 234 Judicial
review of board decisions, according to Professor Bainbridge, may
"destroy the interpersonal relationships that foster these forms of in-
ternal board governance. ' 235 He further argues that the board's inter-
230. See supra Part II.C.2.
231. See supra text accompanying note 141.
232. Bainbridge, supra note 202, at 44.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 45-46.
235. Id. at 46.
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nal dynamics theory explains the "inapplicability of the business
judgment rule to fraud or self-dealing. '236
When an individual director decides to pursue a course of self-deal-
ing, however, he or she usually acts alone and, moreover, betrays his
or her fellow directors' trust. It makes sense for courts to be less
concerned with damage to internal team governance when the de-
fendant director's misconduct has already harmed that governance
structure through betrayal. 237
The expansive good faith evaluation I propose is consistent with the
board's internal dynamics theory Professor Bainbridge argues. A well-
functioned board with productive internal board governance is more
likely to receive a judge's deference than a poorly operated board.
The expansive good faith review should foster boards to develop and
maintain its internal governance structure. Judges are more likely to
appreciate a board's well-established internal dynamics under an ex-
pansive good faith review rather than under the transactional ap-
proach. This is because, under the transactional approach, judges may
have too limited facts to recognize the board's internal dynamics.
3. Judges Are Well Suited to Evaluate Directors' Good Faith
The second main justification for the business judgment rule is that
judges are not business experts.238 Perhaps many judges lack general
business expertise and are ill-equipped when having to dig through
complex financial analysis, but Delaware chancellors often have sig-
nificant prior corporate experience. 239 Moreover, as Professor Bain-
bridge points out, medical doctors and engineers do not receive
similar deference as business people, and most judges do not have
more medical or engineering experience than business experience.2 40
Thus, this business expertise rationale in reality is the same as the risk-
averse rationale discussed above. Reasonable minds may differ given
the same set of facts, so judges should not second-guess a well deliber-
ated business decision, even if the decision turned out to be wrong.
The expansive good faith evaluation I propose does not call upon
judges to impose their own business opinions for the board decision in
dispute. Instead, the good faith evaluation is more similar to a moral
judgment valuation that judges frequently perform. Judges do not de-
cide whether the particular business decision is correct or not. Instead,
they focus on the entire board operation and general board atmos-
236. Id.
237. Bainbridge, supra note 202, at 46-47 (citations omitted).
238. See supra note 201.
239. Bainbridge, supra note 202, at 40.
240. Id. at 39-40.
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phere to see whether, given how the board in general performs its
duties, the board has been so passive or an executive has been so
dominant that virtually all of the board decisions are inadequately
made.
One potential concern to the expansive good faith evaluation is that
judges will be presented with far more evidence than under the cur-
rent transactional approach. But if this approach will help corporate
boards to become more active and their working relationship with the
executives more productive, the additional cost is well worth it. Both
Chancellors Strine and Chandler have argued that the highly specific
federal rules in SOX are an intrusion to the more flexible and "princi-
ples-based" state law.2 4 1 They also admit that this federal encroach-
ment into state law "may be due in part to the failure of Delaware law
to respond with sufficient speed to changes in business practices. '242
Then, accordingly, Delaware law should step up to deal with the
board passivity problem rather than simply adding rhetoric only in
times of crisis and scandals. Time will prove the SOX ineffective,
which means a significant void still exists in our corporate law. Moreo-
ver, crisis and scandals accumulate during peaceful time. If the expan-
sive good faith review pressures boards to properly govern their own
monitoring role, this benefit is well worth the additional evidentiary
cost to the courts.
4. Application: Disney
In this Subsection, I apply the expansive good faith evaluation I
proposed to the Disney case described in Section II.C above. When
performing the expansive good faith evaluation, besides focusing on
the Disney board's deliberation surrounding the hiring of Michael
Ovitz, as Chancellor Chandler did in the Disney litigations, the court
should also allow plaintiffs to show that the Disney board consistently
disposed of its decisions quickly and casually by almost always follow-
ing Eisner's direction. The court noted how swiftly the board ap-
proved the employment agreement with Ovitz: (1) Eisner and his
personal attorney were primarily responsible for negotiating the terms
of the employment agreement; (2) they informed the hiring decision
and the terms to two members of the compensation committee by
phone; (3) the compensation committee approved the deal in its one-
hour meeting, during which the committee also considered other
241. Griffith, supra note 191, at 50; see William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New
Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Re-
sidents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 979 (2003).
242. Griffith, supra note 191, at 50.
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agendas; and (4) the board then voted to approve the deal during its
board meeting, which was led by Eisner.243 Certainly for a multi-bil-
lion dollar company like Disney, the board may not need to spend a
considerable amount of time deliberating a compensation package
worth hundreds of millions of dollars. The Disney board probably had
to discuss a number of important business agendas on a regular basis,
so, for Ovitz's hiring, the Disney board did not feel that it had to
spend more time than what it actually spent. But suppose the Disney
board disposed virtually all of its important business decisions in the
same fashion as how it approved Ovitz's employment agreement.
Then the board is more likely to have consciously disregarded its re-
sponsibilities. If a board simply disposes its duties by following the
executives' directions, then the board is more like a faqade, without
performing any useful functions, let alone performing any monitoring
role.
To be sure, Chancellor Chandler was sensitive to Eisner's domi-
nance in the board. When discussing the good faith doctrine, Chancel-
lor Chandler mentions the "imperial CEO," implying Eisner's control
over the board.244 But if the court only focuses on facts surrounding
Ovitz's hiring decision, then no matter how dominant Eisner was in
this one transaction, the court may not be certain that this dominance
rises to the level of an imperial CEO. The court, as particularly sensi-
tive to its hindsight bias, may be unable to conclude that the board
was virtually useless based on only the facts surrounding this one
transaction. If the court saw a consistent pattern of Eisner guiding the
board in virtually all matters, then the plaintiffs would have a much
stronger claim that the board was not in good faith and failed its fidu-
ciary duty.
IV. CONCLUSION
Boards of directors in the real world possess a number of character-
istics contrary to what the law assumes. The law's wrong assumptions
explain why boards of directors have performed their monitoring job
unsatisfactorily to most shareholders and to the public despite existing
case law protections for shareholders. First, shareholders do not
choose most directors. Instead, shareholders elect the directors be-
cause firms' executives have nominated the directors on the election
ballot. As a result, directors naturally are more loyal to the executives
243. See Part II.C.2.
244. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I), 907 A.2d 693, 761 n.487 (Del. Ch.
2005).
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than to the shareholders. Second, within the board, directors face the
same collective action problems as faced by shareholders. The direc-
tors are of equal status on the board, so each member shares a small
portion of the benefit from monitoring but has to bear the full cost.
The directors have a poor incentive to be active because their com-
pensation usually does not award them to spend extra effort than to
merely attend board meetings. The boards' large size for most publicly
traded companies further aggravates the collective action problem.
Third, executives have a natural tendency to entrench the board. This
tendency drives the board members to gradually defer to the
executives.
Independent directors still face the same problems as insider direc-
tors, and, in many situations, problems are even worse with indepen-
dent directors. The independent directors are still chosen by a firm's
executives, their livelihood is less attached to the firm's success, and
they must spend more effort than insider directors to learn about the
firm. Except perhaps during crisis, independent directors are not bet-
ter than insider directors in their monitoring role. This explains why
studies have consistently concluded that independent directors do not
improve a firm's performance and these directors have a positive in-
fluence on the firm at best during crisis. Disney, WorldCom, and En-
ron are three recent examples of massive boards' monitoring failure,
even though, in all three cases, the boards were composed of a major-
ity of independent directors.
Despite studies' consistent findings that independent directors do
not perform a better monitoring role, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, under which all publicly traded corporations must have
audit committees composed entirely of independent directors. 245 But
even though SOX is a poor means to an end, it is Congress's response
to public outcries over a series of corporate scandals. 246 This response
also reflects how state law has unsatisfactorily shaped corporate gov-
ernance. Therefore, states, particularly Delaware, should step up and
reassess its basic legal assumptions towards boards' role. I propose
that the Delaware courts adopt an expansive good faith evaluation for
overall board operations instead of focusing solely on the transaction
in dispute. Without looking beyond one board transaction, the court
may not have sufficient facts to conclude that the board has, in gen-
eral, failed its monitoring role. This expansive good faith evaluation
should not deter directors' risk taking or deter qualified individuals
245. See supra text accompanying note 183.
246. See supra text accompanying note 189.
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from serving on corporate boards. Moreover, this expansive good
faith evaluation is more like a character valuation, for which judges
are well suited and often called upon to perform. This expansive good
faith evaluation may add pressures to corporate boards to evaluate
their own monitoring role on a regular basis and may thus push them
to become more active.
A magic formula to cure boards' monitoring deficiencies probably
does not exist. But a uniform federal statute making rigid require-
ments on all publicly traded corporations creates only inefficiencies
without leading to any of the intended consequences. These inefficien-
cies will eventually be borne by shareholders and the overall econ-
omy. Time is set for state law to make a drastic change.
